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Abstract
The socialist reconstruction of Sofia evolved at the juncture of institution-building, for-
mation of professional expertise and social engineering, framed by a party ideology in 
a flux that time and again revised the social mission of urbanism and the professional 
role of the architect. This paper first focuses on four areas of Sofia’s reconstruction that 
illustrate the interplay of ideology and urbanism in the Stalinist years: the endorse-
ment and subsequent betrayal of Marxist guidelines for urban planning; the replica-
tion of the leader cult and its prime monument, the Mausoleum; the reorganization 
of architects into a Soviet-style professional union; the application of the Stalinist art 
canon in monumental architecture. The paper then discusses how de- Stalinization 
affected urban planning, public architecture and architects’ professional standing. It 
concludes by reflecting on the post-1989 transformation of Sofia as a radical breach 
with socialism or a symptom of path dependence.
Keywords
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In 1931, Lazar Kaganovich, First Secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (cpsu), proclaimed: “Our cities 
became socialist from the very moment of the October Revolution, when we 
expropriated the bourgeoisie and socialized the means of production” (Kagan-
ovich 1931: 82). Insofar as this statement was the stepping stone of Kaganovich’s 
blueprint for the socialist reconstruction of Moscow and other Soviet cities, it 
might have provided some guidance for political reform to the later adherents 
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to state socialism in Central and Eastern Europe, but what it implied for the 
practice of urban planners and architects there was far from  self- evident. This 
paper deals with the transfer of knowledge from the Soviet Union to the capi-
tal of one of its satellites, Sofia, in the postwar years of Stalinism. This trans-
fer is tackled through the permeation of ideology and city making—or what 
can be qualified as an endeavor to translate political ideologemes into spatial 
design.
Since the socialist city first attracted scholarly attention within the fields of 
history of architecture and urban studies, its typological specificity has for a 
long time been treated with a narrow focus on its material form. That is, all that 
differentiates it from the synchronous cities of Western liberal democracies 
with free market economies is often reduced to matters of art style, or patterns 
of land use and distribution of amenities (e.g. Paperny 2002, French and Ham-
ilton 1979, Andrusz at al. 1996). When the political economy of state socialism 
enters these discussions, it is through the channel of ideology which however 
is seen as something rather external to the city as such: the impetus behind 
party diktat that forced the choice of one architectural style over another or 
the prioritization of certain socio-spatial arrangements, as well as the utopian 
vision of society that those choices presumably reflected. Hence, the unique-
ness of the socialist type of city is judged by its success or failure to produce its 
own architectural expression or to embody socialist norms in the urban struc-
ture. In recent years, several case studies have enriched these approaches to 
socialist urbanity by highlighting administrative processes of policy-making, 
bureaucratic restructuring of professional expertise, conditions of everyday 
life, agendas of social engineering and patterns of social mobility as integral 
not only to a proper understanding of the dynamics of urban development 
under socialism but also to the very nature of the socialist city (e.g. Zarecor 
2011, Lebow 2013, Molnár 2013, Harris 2013; see also Kokin 1997, Crowley and 
Reid 2002).
The analysis below embraces this complex perspective towards the social-
ist city, positioning its development at the juncture of institution-building, 
formation of professional expertise and social engineering. This juncture was 
no doubt framed by the party ideology which however, far from being static 
and monolithic, underwent interpretative changes and bore unresolved con-
tradictions. This paper explores the early Sovietization of Sofia through four 
aspects of the dual transfer of political ideology and urbanist practice: the en-
dorsement and subsequent betrayal of the Marxist call for abolishing the dif-
ference between town and country in postwar urban planning; the replication 
of Lenin’s Mausoleum and the underlying leader cult in the construction of 
Georgi Dimitrov’s Mausoleum; the institutional reorganization of architects 
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into a Soviet-style professional union; the application of socialist realism in 
monumental architecture. After analyzing the emulation of Soviet ideas and 
practices in the Stalinist years, the paper outlines the changes induced by de-
Stalinization that affected urban planning, public architecture and architects’ 
professional standing from the mid-1950s into the 1960s. The epilogue touches 
upon the post-1989 transformation of Sofia in light of its socialist legacy, pos-
ing the question to what extent recent urban development manifests a radical 
breach with the past or path dependence.
 The Interplay between Socialist Ideology and Urbanism
The translation of socialist ideology into urbanism is not necessarily ciphered 
in stylistic particularities, contrary to the expectations of some art historians. 
The notion that socialist ideology is reflected in a specific artistic outlook finds 
a particularly strong voice with regard to Stalinism. This is exemplified by the 
seminal work of Vladimir Paperny (2002), which emphasizes the rigid and stat-
ic nature of Soviet architecture in the period following Stalin’s consolidation 
of power in the late 1920s. Paperny’s assessment is grounded on a distinction 
between the Stalinist architectural canon of socialist realism and the revolu-
tionary experimentation with brave new designs of the earlier avant-garde 
movement in Soviet urbanism. This contrasting comparison outlines a series 
of oppositions characterizing the two trends: movement versus immobility, 
horizontality versus verticality, uniformity versus hierarchism, collectivism 
versus individualism, improvisation versus notation.
Shining through this treatment of Stalinist architecture is a strongly evalu-
ative judgment lamenting the closure of avant-gardism after the state central-
ization of the artistic milieu in 1932. Whereas for Paperny this institutional 
reform is a condition for ideological subordination of socialist architecture 
and hence an endpoint to its artistic originality, in this paper the top-down 
reorganization of architects’ unions with the ensuing bureaucratic tensions is 
analyzed as an equally significant dimension of socialist urbanism alongside 
issues of artistic style. Seen in this light, the hijacking of technical practice 
by an expanding state apparatus is understood not as an endpoint but as the 
beginning of a sinuous process of negotiating the roles and tasks of technical 
cadres vis-à-vis political command.
Against Paperny’s dichotomous story of Soviet architecture, Boris Groys 
(2003) develops an interpretation based on the notion of evolution rather 
than a breach. In his perspective, socialist realism is seen as a stylistic con-
tender subscribing to the same fundamental mission that the avant-garde had 
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 earlier embraced. This point is important because it underscores the variety 
of manifestations that the interplay between art and ideology assumed over 
time. With respect to the socialist city, such an understanding grants prece-
dence to ideological compatibilities over stylistic discords. Even when short of 
artistic originality, the socialist city still correlated to the political line that was 
endorsed at the time.
The antithetical delineation of an ideologically induced rift in Soviet ar-
chitecture is contested also by Anders Åman (2002). His critique targets 
the grounding of Paperny’s oppositions on presumably evident stylistic con-
trasts which he identifies as variants of the clash between modernism and tra-
ditionalism. Arguing against such an evaluation, Åman’s general point is that 
political ideology cannot be deduced from the art forms alone. For him, the 
relationship between architecture and ideology was far more complex than 
suggested by its reduction to a purely stylistic expression (ibid., 256). Yet, 
Åman himself does not completely abandon such a mechanistic treatment of 
this relationship when he concludes that “architecture does have expression, 
but ideological meaning is added to it” (ibid., 257). His interpretation of this 
link as additive suggests that ideology was applied to art externally and only 
secondarily. In this paper, in contrast, the relation between ideology and ar-
chitecture is viewed as essential: architects’ work was motivated, guided and 
structured in many ways, not the least of which was the institutional, by the 
accepted ideology. Furthermore, the interplay between ideology and urbanism 
took place beneath the façade of architectural expression by privileging cer-
tain spatial segments, land uses, public functions and institutional processes 
of making the city.
All this being said, the guiding ideology was neither inflexible, nor was its 
translation in urban planning and architecture free of ambiguities. Political vi-
sions often translated into mutually contradictory urbanist principles, and ide-
ology itself was subjected to reevaluation that nurtured new concerns for the 
urban environment. Furthermore, the bureaucratic apparatus that supervised 
urban development was hardly the “united front” imagined by the rhetoric of 
“democratic centralism” under the leadership of the party. It was fragmented 
into sectors that pursued their own agendas, strove to fulfill their own plan 
targets and, as a result, saturated urban affairs with inter-institutional conflicts 
(Bater 1980: 40–41; Hamilton 1979: 201–2). Finally, the translation of ideology 
into urban planning and architecture was not a mere opportunistic act on the 
part of the technical cadres. Their effort to give technical expression to po-
litical ideology in the socialist reconstruction of Sofia was intertwined with 
the institutional history of Bulgarian architects—the evolution of their profes-
sional stakes, credentials and reflections.
Stanoeva
southeastern europe 41 (2017) 112-140
<UN>
116
 Sovietizing Urban Planning: Abolishing the Difference between 
Center and Periphery
Coming out of World War ii and into the sphere of influence of the ussr, 
Bulgaria underwent a process of Sovietization that affected not only its politi-
cal system and economy but also all professional fields and employment allo-
cation within them. This process started shortly after the communist-led coup 
of September 9, 1944, hailed as a native socialist revolution. In the realm of ar-
chitecture, regime change meant, on the one hand, promotion of a new urban 
arrangement that would reflect the new political values of the state and en-
hance their instilment in society, and, on the other hand, reorganization of the 
associations of architects into state-managed bureaus under party supervision. 
Both processes were inspired by Soviet models of space production and gover-
nance. In the so-called “socialist reconstruction” of Sofia, this transfer shaped 
urban plans, iconic architecture, art theory and institutional structures.
As the Marxist-Leninist doctrine had to be pursued in all spheres of profes-
sional practice, architects faced the challenge of lending content to the urban-
istically vague ideal of a socialist city (Musil 2003: 27). In this task, one of the 
few guidelines provided was the Marxist call for leveling the discrepancies be-
tween town and country, thus creating a social world of equality in conditions 
of life and access to amenities.
The postwar master plan of Sofia was ratified in late 1945 as the foundation 
on which Bulgarian planners and architects were expected to launch the so-
cialist reconstruction of the capital, thus also setting the tone for a nationwide 
urban transformation. In the words of Lyuben Tonev, author of the plan and 
head of the municipal Architecture and Urban Planning Department (aupd), 
the leitmotif of his “concept for the future city” was to redirect improvements 
from the center, which had previously “absorbed all financial resources and 
public works” to the periphery, “monotonous and grey—abandoned to sprawl 
endlessly and lost in mud, misery and a lack of any basic living conditions” 
(Tonev 1945: 39). In its attempt to decentralize amenities in a network of sec-
ondary centers and equalize quality of life throughout the city, Tonev’s plan 
was indeed a faithful adaptation of the Marxist call for abolishing the town-
country divide to the microlevel of the city. However, the newly appointed city 
authorities did not trust local architects’ capacity to envisage what a socialist 
city should look like, and instead relied on Soviet tutelage. This was safeguard-
ed through the involvement of prominent Soviet architects in the assessment 
and revision of the master plan—most notably, Alexey Shchusev, designer of 
Lenin’s Mausoleum in Moscow, and Nikolai Baranov, the chief architect of Len-
ingrad (ibid., 45).
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Despite Tonev’s preference for a decentralized pattern of urban develop-
ment, in the ensuing construction program the city administration gave pri-
macy to the center and especially to the square next to the former Royal Palace 
whose fate to be demolished was sealed by the master plan. In this aspect, the 
vision for the Bulgarian socialist capital diverged from the Soviet model, since 
in Moscow the Tsarist bastion of the Kremlin had been reclaimed by the Soviet 
leadership as a symbol of imperial glory (Anderson 1991: 160). Devoid of a long 
historical tradition, the Royal Palace in Sofia was moreover perceived as the 
seat of foreign power—the German dynasty of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha that had 
ruled the country until the socialist coup in 1944. By pulling down the palace, 
the replanning of the square held a powerful potential to signal the recent re-
gime change. Indeed, this square would soon be renamed “Ninth of Septem-
ber” to honor Bulgaria’s socialist revolution, and the monarchy was officially 
overhauled through a referendum in September 1946. This placed the square 
at the very center of the reconstruction of Sofia.
Endorsed by the central authorities, the policy of embellishing the center 
at the expense of the periphery no doubt had an ambivalent ideological foot-
ing. Yet, it followed the Soviet path of urban development, the benchmark of 
which, the General Plan for the Reconstruction of Moscow of 1935, was based 
on a pronouncedly radial scheme promoting the aggrandizement of the cen-
tral area around the seat of Soviet power (Bater 1980: 29–30). On the one hand, 
the prioritization of the monumental refurbishment of Sofia’s center reflected 
the party’s taste for symbolic representation in opulent landmarks. On the 
other hand, it clearly compromised the declared socialist mission of the re-
construction to improve the living conditions of the working class that resided 
far from the center (Stanoeva 2013: 63–9). The latter’s housing situation had 
been  aggravated not only by prior neglect, but also by the wartime air raids: 
95% of 5,288 damaged buildings were private, mainly ramshackle houses of 
one story, and more than half of the owners belonged to the proletariat (sgs 
1958: 136; Genev 1947: 63). The housing crisis was further complicated by the 
legislative provisions for rebuilding the housing stock, which not only levied 
the expenses on homeowners, but also gave municipal authorities exclusive 
rights to mandate repairs and execute them through compulsory mortgaging 
(dv 1945: 2). Dogmatically applying the Soviet doctrine of limiting landown-
ers’ property rights to prevent speculative renting (Stoilov 1946: 14–6), this 
policy contradicted the real situation of postwar deterioration, where most 
damaged properties were the owner-occupied family homes of impoverished 
households.
Following the adoption of the master plan, the reconstruction of Sofia fo-
cused on the central area, triggering a series of competitions for its detailed 
Stanoeva
southeastern europe 41 (2017) 112-140
<UN>
118
plan in 1946 and 1947, none of which, however, produced a winning entry 
(see  Figure 1). Whereas the first competition combined this planning task with 
an assignment for standardized social housing in recognition of the “acute prob-
lem” of housing shortage,1 the later competition programs limited their briefs 
to the center. The budget absorbed in the cycle of competitions increased from 
one contest to another, reaching a lump sum of 3,175,000 leva,2 compared to the 
modest expenses of 160,000 for the housing designs.3 Meanwhile, the popula-
tion of Sofia was growing at a high rate, reaching an increase of 53% in the five 
years following the coup, and housing construction lagged behind to the extent 
that newly built units could accommodate only 10% of the  newcomers, not 
1 da-Sf, f. 65, op. 1, a.e. 70, l. 390–391.
2 da-Sf, f. 65, op. 1, a.e. 77, l. 36–39; da-Sf, f. 65, op. 1, a.e. 84, l. 451–456, 487–489; da-Sf, f. 65, 
op. 1, a.e. 91, l. 528–534.
3 da-Sf, f. 65, op. 1, a.e. 82, l. 316–317.
Figure 1 Purchased projects in the competition for a plan of the center in 1947.
arhitektura 10/1947: 4, 5, 9.
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accounting for the unresolved housing needs of locals.4 The funding siphoned 
into the planning of the center came from a special budget for the reconstruc-
tion, earmarked partly for the implementation of the master plan. Yet, in the 
outer residential districts planning was long postponed, leading to a systematic 
decline of construction permits during a worsening housing shortage.5
What contributed to the disproportionately high expenses of the competi-
tions for the center were not only their multiple stages, but also the participa-
tion of foreign experts in the jury committees to add prestige to the assignment. 
As Soviet experts declined to join the proceedings,6 international expertise 
was provided by other fraternal countries. Yet, in contrast to the unconditional 
acceptance granted to Soviet recommendations, the input of their colleagues 
from elsewhere remained largely disregarded. Indeed, the two honorary guests, 
Josip Seissel from Zagreb and Alois Mikuškovic from Prague, both warned 
against the overloading of the central square with representational uses and 
political functions (Seissel 1947: 12; Mikuškovic 1948: 20–22). Mikuškovic even 
advanced a proposal to develop the central boulevard running through Ninth 
of September Square into a “traditional promenade” and preserve the palace. 
However, the prototype sought to be reproduced in Sofia was Moscow’s Red 
Square—parade grounds intended to host marching proletarian columns sa-
luting their leaders rather than the evening strolls of carefree urbanites.
As the administratively guided transfer of knowledge privileged Soviet ex-
pertise, the final plan for the center of 1948 was elaborated with the assistance 
of Soviet specialists (Tonev 1949: 58). Diverging even further from the recom-
mendations of Seissel and Mikuškovic, this plan increased the congestion of 
political functions around Ninth of September Square by outlining an adjacent 
assembly around a headquarters for the Bulgarian Communist Party (bcp)—
hereafter known as the Party House. This centerpiece reflected the recent con-
solidation of power by the bcp, which had eliminated coalition partners and 
opposition alike and established a mono-party system of a Soviet type.
 Soviet-Styled Landmarks: the Leader Cult and the Leader’s 
Mausoleum
Ever since the adoption of the master plan, Sofia’s main square had been des-
ignated for monumental redress, yet towards the end of the 1940s it was still 
awaiting its proper socialist landmark. While the projects for removing the 
4 da-Sf, f. 65, op. 1, a.e. 379, l. 5.
5 da-Sf, f. 65, op. 1, a.e. 75, l. 292–293.
6 da-Sf, f. 65, op. 1, a.e. 70, l. 406–13.
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 former palace were time and again dismissed in the lengthy series of archi-
tectural competitions, an unexpected political event occurred that would ef-
fectively transform the scenography of Ninth of September Square. On July 2, 
1949, Georgi Dimitrov, party leader and prime minister, died. The following day, 
a mourning session of the Politburo was summoned, at which the party’s top 
brass decided to preserve Dimitrov’s body in a mausoleum, as had been done 
with Lenin. The decision to emulate the Soviet prototype was no doubt ap-
proved in advance by the Soviet leadership, as the top-secret embalmment had 
to be performed by the scientific team from the laboratory of Lenin’s Mauso-
leum. In the years ahead, the maintenance of the body and the building instal-
lations remained entirely dependent on the goodwill of the Soviet authorities.
Due to the uniqueness of this type of monument and the political rituals 
of charismatic legitimation revolving around it, the scientific gift of the em-
balmment was a rare privilege to a fraternal country reaffirming its bond of 
friendship with the ussr and signaling its belonging to the closest circle of 
Soviet allies. A monument of the highest order, the Mausoleum was a material 
incarnation of the leader cult engineered by Stalin and then inculcated in the 
people’s democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. Within this ritualistic cul-
ture, the key personalities of the cult, Lenin and Stalin, were joined by national 
leaders who nurtured their own subsidiary cults emphasizing first and fore-
most their status of loyal disciples (Rees 2004: 19). In the Soviet sphere, Georgi 
Dimitrov’s Mausoleum was the first replica of Lenin’s, followed later by several 
others, most notably those of Klement Gottwald, Ho Chi Minh, Mao Zedong 
and Kim Il Sung (and more recently Kim Jong Il).
The Bulgarian Politburo’s memorandum on Dimitrov’s Mausoleum speci-
fied its location on Ninth of September Square and the new building project 
was expediently commissioned to the Central Architectural Planning Bureau, 
where architects were mobilized to elaborate alternative designs overnight 
(Arhitektura 1950: 4). Despite the tight schedule and the lack of any local expe-
rience with such a building, which demanded complex technical installations 
and a thermally insulated chamber, projects were submitted the following 
morning. A design based on a classical pantheon-shaped structure of 560 m2 
and a height of 12 m was approved, and its implementation began immediate-
ly. Though opting for a different classical shape from that of Lenin’s pyramidal 
mausoleum, the design stayed true to the prototype in size and crucial details. 
These details included not only the interior arrangement of the chamber but 
also the frontal tribune outside, which was reserved for the party leadership 
during mass parades (see Figure 2). This ceremonial use of mausoleums en-
hanced their symbolic effect whereby the charismatic legitimacy of the party 
founder resonated through his successors. The leader cult therefore spread 
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concentric circles of legitimacy across time—from the departed leader to his 
successor—and across space—from the Soviet power center to the satellites. 
In Sofia, the Mausoleum would become the centerpiece not only of the coun-
try’s political core, but also of the Soviet-style mass parades staged on key dates 
of the socialist calendar (Stanoeva 2011).
Upon the approval of the Mausoleum project, its accelerated execution 
proceeded with the mobilization of hundreds of construction workers who 
worked around the clock to complete the job in less than a week. Thanks to 
their tireless efforts Dimitrov’s body was laid to rest on July 10, 1949, eight 
days after his death. This feat inspired an entire propaganda genre highlight-
ing the Mausoleum’s builders. Their broadcasted story provided an additional 
source of popular legitimation by ascertaining the dedication of the proletar-
ian masses to Dimitrov’s legacy through their laborious efforts. Heroization 
Figure 2 The Mausoleum of Georgi Dimitrov.
sofiya 10/1959: 4.
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of labor was yet another political value transplanted from the ussr, where 
work was averred a fundamental principle of the new society, ingrained in the 
Soviet constitution of 1936. Hailed by mass media as setting an example similar 
to that of Stakhanovites in factory production, the construction workers on 
the Mausoleum’s building site were celebrated as “heroes of labor”: almost a 
hundred among them were awarded medals and more than a thousand cash 
prizes.7 Although the chief architect of the building was decorated with gold, 
it was the fervor at the construction site that produced a metaphorical image 
of the struggle to build socialism, and not the expert’s meticulous work at the 
drawing board.
Moreover, as indicated by a confidential governmental decree from the 
time when the Mausoleum’s construction was coming to a close, its design was 
considered “provisional” and the architectural bureau had to elaborate an en-
tirely new project in the months after the official opening.8 The new project, 
however, was rejected because of the danger of damaging the basic structure.9 
A follow-up internal decree of July 1950 reduced the required design revision 
to minor changes in the exterior with the argument that the current look of 
the Mausoleum had “already been deeply comprehended by our entire nation 
with its stern and simple forms.”10 This decision was apparently based on a 
concern for preserving the myth of the heroic speedy construction rather than 
on a high appraisal of the architectural qualities of the existing building, as the 
government argued that a more elaborate reworking “would cause a great con-
fusion […] since the Mausoleum itself was constructed in 130 hours, whereas 
its final design would take a few years.”11
The public exposure of all additional works on the Mausoleum’s exterior 
along with the assembly of air-conditioning and other installations in the 
months after it was declared complete was kept at a minimum, to which end 
the national counterintelligence service supervised the project.12 A year lat-
er, another confidential resolution requested a brand new revetment for the 
building, replacing the original white stone with dark red granite—clearly to 
enhance the resemblance to Lenin’s Mausoleum.13 Despite mobilizing the en-
tire state administration to assist the execution of this high-priority project, 
7 TsDA, f. 136, op. 3, a.e. 251, l. 34–45.
8 TsDA, f. 136, op. 5, a.e. 2052, l. 7.
9 TsDA, f. 136, op. 5, a.e. 1238.
10 TsDA, f. 136, op. 5, a.e. 2052, l. 1.
11 TsDA, f. 136, op. 5, a.e. 2052, l. 8.
12 da-Sf, f. 3868, op. 1, a.e. 1, l. 3.
13 Ibid., 1.
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by 1953 it was dropped because of the insufficient extraction of red granite.14 
Thus, a few years after its much celebrated completion, the Mausoleum was 
finally actually complete, providing the center of socialist Sofia with its long-
awaited emblem.
 Sovietizing Institutions: Bureaucratic Centralization of Urban 
Planning and Architecture
While the monumental embellishment of Sofia’s center along Soviet lines was 
proceeding at two speeds—either blocked in a protracted series of competi-
tions or accelerated to a Stakhanovite construction tempo—the technical 
cadres in charge of the socialist reconstruction went through an institutional 
reorganization that was itself styled upon earlier Soviet reforms. With admin-
istrative centralization underway, the authority of architects was gradually un-
dermined and subordinated to political accountability.
The first step in this process was initiated immediately after the proclama-
tion of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria. In October 1946, the Act on the Or-
ganization and Utilization of Technical Cadres was ratified, which effectively 
eliminated freelance architecture by restricting work licenses to state and 
municipal bureaus, thus nationalizing employment allocation (dv 1946). This 
was certainly not the technocratic reform that Bulgarian architects anticipated 
would elevate their professional status with the advent of socialism. Their op-
timistic expectation was formulated in a headline publication in the journal of 
their chamber which conceptualized the “social role of the engineer and the 
architect” under the new regime as standing at the helm of the technocratic 
rule that would inevitably rise out of the politically driven transformation 
(Georgov 1947).
However, at the time when this ambitious manifesto was published, the le-
gal reforms concerning engineering and architecture did not aim at building a 
technocracy that would take the steering wheel of the national economy but, 
on the contrary, initiated a process of subordinating these fields to state con-
trol and party loyalty. Despite the lobbying efforts of architects’ corporations to 
secure some professional autonomy, their limited and short-term success was 
the delineation of a narrow niche for private practice that was excluded from 
public commissioning and served solely private construction (dv 1947: 5). This 
niche was further contracted as policy transfer from the ussr led to national-
ization of land, industry, banking and urban estates at the end of 1947. The last 
14 da-Sf, f. 3868, op. 1, a.e. 2, l. 1.
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blow against the independent standing of architects’ associations was a state 
decree from 1949 that dissolved all of them, reorganizing practitioners into a 
Soviet-styled professional union under the auspices of the state-run Scientific- 
Technical Union (stu) (dv 1949). As explained retrospectively by the Politburo, 
the purpose of this “unionization” was mainly political indoctrination of tech-
nical cadres in Marxism-Leninism and the Sovietization of their expertise.15
Parallel to the endorsement of “democratic centralism” as a principle of party 
rule transplanted from the Soviet Union, administrative centralization was im-
posed not only on all branches of the economy, but also on the architectural and 
urban planning bureaus with the establishment of the Architecture Directorate 
at the Ministry of Communal Economy and Public Works (mcepw) in March 
1950 (pinm 1954: 5–7). As stipulated by the new legislation, the minister had the 
right to nominate, dismiss and reassign technical cadres in all local administra-
tions. Down the chain of command, the chief county architects were mandated 
to assess not only the professional qualifications but also the political reliability 
of their subordinates, as well as to raise their  “ideological-political level” (ibid.: 
15). Technical cadres’ political consciousness was trained through a number of 
workplace-based ideological activities: lectures in  Marxism- Leninism, studies 
of the biographies of Stalin and Dimitrov,  political  uplifting of the collective, 
organized participation in mass parades and so forth.
Far from optimizing management over the construction realm, centralized 
oversight encumbered technical activities with a ponderous system of political 
accountability. As a large-scale urbanist project with high political stakes and 
broad participation of institutions, the planning of the Stalinist center of Sofia in 
the first half of the 1950s was a glaring illustration of the inter-institutional fric-
tion stemming from this Sovietization of urbanist practice. This planning enter-
prise covered Ninth of September Square, where the former Royal Palace was to 
be replaced by an edifice for the Council of Ministers (cm), and the grounds in 
front of the Party House, where an entire ensemble of five more buildings had to 
monumentally frame the square. This so-called “Largo” included ministerial ed-
ifices for the two prominent economic sectors, in accordance with the Leninist 
emphasis on industrialization and electrification, a Central Department Store 
emulating Moscow’s TsUM in showcasing the progress of socialist production, a 
Representational Hotel for high-ranking city visitors and a dominant structure 
for the House of Soviets, yet another Soviet replica (see Figure 3).
Similarly to the top-priority project of the Mausoleum, this complex plan-
ning assignment was rushed by a tight schedule. The close deadlines increased 
the pressure on the organizations involved as well as the tensions among them. 
15 TsDA, f. 1B, op. 6, a.e. 1645, l. 188.
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This tension ran both vertically, along the chain of command, and horizontally, 
between partnering architectural teams as well as between their bureaus and 
construction agencies. In the first place, the process was impeded precisely 
by centralized oversight, as the cm was extremely slow in giving its approval 
to submitted plans, so that advancement from one phase to another was in-
terrupted by long intervals of bureaucratic reviewing. This led to the absurd 
situation of architectural teams elaborating projects for the commissioned 
buildings ahead of a final decision on the outlines of the two squares and the 
designated plots for the buildings.16
Secondly, the planning process was obstructed by the complicated interac-
tions among sectoral interests within the state apparatus represented by the 
so-called “investors” for the individual buildings (several ministries and the 
City Council). Although it was not the investor but the cm initiating the un-
dertaking, the investor nevertheless had to provide funding and technical as-
sistance and to formally approve the architectural project. Since investors had 
their own plan targets to meet, they lacked an incentive to reallocate resources 
into additional projects whose elaboration was the responsibility of another 
branch of the bureaucracy—in this case, the mcepw. Although not in any 
position to openly reject an assigned investment project, investors could still 
delay its implementation simply by withholding their sanction. As summa-
rized by Boris Markov, the head of the mcepw Architecture Directorate, called 
the “chief architect of the republic,” the planning of Sofia’s center confronted 
16 TsDA, f. 136, op. 12, a.e. 1034, l. 1 – 2.
Figure 3 The plan for Ninth of September Sq. and Largo (1954).
arhitektura 3–4/1954: 50.
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 serious travails in the interaction with all other branches of the bureaucracy: 
from the “complete lack of interest in the execution of the tasks” at the aupd, 
to the “indifferent attitude” of the chief architect of the capital, to the non-
assistance and delay of approval from all investors.17
Despite these external obstacles, the heads of the Architecture Directorate 
and the mandated architectural bureau were caught in the crosshairs when 
the government decided to impose sanctions on the delays. In October 1952, 
both directors were penalized for the “political weakness […] that the dead-
lines set by the government are generally not met in due time.”18 By that time, 
the collaboration between the two, Boris Markov and Lyuben Furnadzhiev, 
had entered a tense phase evident in their mutual attacks of fierce criticism. 
This strain resulted from yet another specificity of socialist bureaucratism—
the Leninist principle of self-criticism that was thoroughly abided by in in-
ternal administrative proceedings. In line with this doctrinaire practice, the 
self- criticizing agency normally admitted to a rather passive shortcoming such 
as being too tolerant of another agency’s mistakes which, for their part, were 
often presented as a symptom of a deep-seated political misdemeanor rather 
than mere operative faults. Since the bureaucratic ritual of self-criticism and 
the imbued criticism was performed in ministerial sessions with the broad 
 participation of subordinate units, mutual accusations created extremely 
 hostile relationships between partnering organizations.19
All these bureaucratic setbacks notwithstanding, the projects were submit-
ted on time and the entire Largo ensemble was approved by the government 
in October 1952.20 The following year, its construction commenced, outpac-
ing the design of Ninth of September Square, which still lacked final autho-
rization.21 The latter proved to be too intricate a task, mainly due to the hasty 
construction of the Party House and the Mausoleum (Petrov 1953: 1–2), which 
would render this square an urbanistic challenge for decades to come (Stano-
eva 2010: 300–310). Also dropped from the construction agenda was the House 
of Soviets, the expected vertical dominant in the Stalinist cityscape of Sofia, 
the approved design of which was shelved, most likely for financial reasons.
Despite the timely completion of the architectural plans, the construc-
tion itself was slowed down because of incoordination between architects 
and constructors—yet another systemic effect of centralized commissioning. 
17 TsDA, f. 188, op. 1, a.e. 4, l. 88.
18 TsDA, f. 188, op. 1, a.e. 5, l. 148.
19 TsDA, f. 188, op. 1, a.e. 5, l. 175; TsDA, f. 188, op. 1, a.e. 5, l. 158.
20 TsDA, f. 188, op. 1, a.e. 5, l. 58.
21 TsDA, f. 188, op. 1, a.e. 10, l. 155.
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Within its division of labor, where each agency advanced the fulfillment of its 
own plan rather than the final product, there seemed to be little concern about 
the overall construction process, since accomplished work was reported based 
on fragmented technical tasks. Very rarely did architects supervise the execu-
tion of their plans or even visit the construction site, therefore, construction 
mistakes often went unnoticed. By the beginning of 1955, when the deadline for 
the construction of the Largo had just passed, there were a number of techni-
cal problems identified at the construction site for which the planning bureaus 
and the construction companies were blaming each other, while investors 
were raising complaints about the delay, despite their own non- assistance.22 
However, the architectural outlook of the ensemble had been already asserted 
as a standard for monumentalizing central squares throughout the country 
and the planning process as a norm for managing such projects.
 Sovietizing the Artistic Vocabulary: National in Form, Socialist 
in Content
As the bcp consolidated its grip on power by the late autumn of 1946, when 
Georgi Dimitrov became prime minister of the newly established republic, the 
transfer of Soviet norms extended beyond the political system to affect policies 
of social engineering and cultural production. Within the art realm, this trans-
fer was grounded on the primacy of socialist realism. It was endorsed at the 
Fifth Party Congress in 1948, when Valko Chervenkov, then Chairman of the 
Committee for Science, Art and Culture and soon to become Georgi Dimitrov’s 
successor, declared a “systematic fight against modernism and formalism, and 
against the harmful influences of contemporary West European bourgeois fine 
art” (bkp 1949: 303). Just like the urbanist vision, this artistic turn reflected the 
Soviet cultural dogma of Stalin’s era. In the Soviet Union, socialist realism was 
made mandatory in 1932 when the Artists’ Union was established (French 1995: 
43), which in the next decade would serve as a model for institutional reorga-
nization in Bulgaria.
Insofar as its message was concerned, socialist realism represented “reality 
seen through the party ideology” (Abel 1987: 143). But what that meant sty-
listically for visual arts and particularly architecture was quite unclear. Yet, 
the architectural community, streamlined into state-run bureaus, was denied 
freedom of interpretation and experimentation with the new art dogma, and 
22 TsDA, f. 188, op. 1, a.e. 15, l. 123; TsDA, f. 215, op. 1, a.e. 14, l. 89, 195; TsDA, f. 215, op. 1, a.e. 54, 
l. 76–8; TsDA, f. 215, op. 1, a.e. 68, l. 116.
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instead had to emulate the Soviet inventory. Whereas in literature socialist re-
alism developed an ideologically sound stylistic form of imbuing reality with 
the anticipated utopia of communism (Clark 2003), in architecture it resorted 
to classical monumental forms—a reference pointing rather to the imperial 
past than to the future social order. The monumental architecture defined in 
this way was expected to communicate the grandeur of socialist power to the 
masses through familiar and easily comprehensible aesthetic means.
Sarcastically dubbed “wedding cake architecture” and described as “left-
wing Classicism” and “red Doric style” (Åman 1992: 55), the architecture of Sta-
lin’s era produced signature buildings that in structure and appearance were 
hard to distinguish. Their prototype was the Palace of Soviets in Moscow—a 
priority project from the early 1930s that never materialized and yet became 
a paper emblem of the Soviet capital and a source of inspiration for the post-
war revamping of the capitals of the satellite states. The sketch of the unbuilt 
Palace of Soviets was widely publicized as evidence of the superiority of the 
socialist system over Western capitalism, printed on dozens of propaganda 
posters and displayed along with political slogans during mass parades in the 
ussr (Rolf 2009: 612). Its exemplary design was recreated in many “tall build-
ings” along Moscow’s central boulevards, most notably Moscow State Universi-
ty. Beyond the Soviet Union, it was copied in large-scale constructions such as 
the Palace of Culture and Science in Warsaw and the Printing House of the Ro-
manian Communist Party in Bucharest—both carrying Stalin’s name (Åman 
1992: 125–41).
A further guideline for the socialist-realist architecture was Stalin’s exhorta-
tion for art that is “national in form, socialist in content.” However, this too did 
not carry much clarity, as one of the Bulgarian architects would exclaim dur-
ing a meeting at the ministry: “It is true that architecture should be national 
in form and socialist in content but we, the architects, have not seen it in its 
actual material appearance.”23 Whereas the “national form” pointed to the cul-
tural legacy of the past, the “socialist content” remained as vague as socialist 
realism itself. Furthermore, the reinvention of past national traditions raised 
complicated questions about their own political context and connotations—
ultimately, about the compatibility of bygone periods with the political and 
social ambitions of socialism.
In Bulgaria, the discovery of architecture “national in form, socialist in 
content” largely relied on the inventory of vernacular construction tradi-
tions compiled in the interwar period. Whereas the source of inspiration for 
 national architecture back then had been chauvinist proclivity (Stanoeva 2014: 
23 TsDA, f. 188, op. 1, a.e. 6, l. 288.
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187–201), it was now resurrected within the frame of socialist internationalism, 
the ideological catchword in consolidating Central and Eastern Europe after 
World War ii into a geopolitical bloc under Soviet control. The paradoxical mix 
of national forms and presumably internationalist content can be understood 
only in relation to the ideological confrontation with the Western camp: “To 
understand the word national as used in national form, we have to appreciate 
that the word is the antithesis of cosmopolitan, and that the latter word, in 
the official usage of the Soviet Union and the people’s democracies, led nearly 
automatically to the use of other words: ‘imperialist,’ ‘capitalist,’ ‘the Anglo-
American warmongers,’ and so on” (Åman 1992: 117). The preoccupation with 
signature buildings that would placard the commitment to socialist interna-
tionalism in the representational centers of the fraternal countries disturbed 
the efforts of postwar reconstruction in many major cities which had suffered 
war destruction by diverting scarce resources into monumental projects (Kulić 
2014: 129–134). Sofia was no exception and, within its postwar reconstruction, 
the Largo ensemble was highlighted as a flagship of socialist urbanism that 
would embody and hereafter represent the principles of the new architecture.
In the early 1950s, when this gigantic project was on the drawing board, 
both tenets—applying Soviet methods and inventing national aesthetics—
caused great confusion among architects and exposed their vulnerability to 
party diktat. On the one hand, the insufficient adherence to Soviet guidelines 
was perceived as dangerously close to “cosmopolitanism in architecture” and 
the “corrupting influences of decadent formalistic currents in West European 
architecture.”24 On the other hand, the emulation of Soviet models point for 
point—“without putting anything of oneself into it”—was also treated as a 
deplorable error.25 Thus, architects found themselves under the double pres-
sure for emulation without imitation, lacking any clues how to navigate the 
thin line between ideological veracity and aesthetical cliché. In this effort, the 
minister provided them with the mystified rule that “one may copy but not so 
much.”26
Facing the dilemma of political dissidence for diverging from the Soviet 
model or a creative failure for emulating it too diligently, the architects involved 
in the Largo’s planning naturally opted for the second vice and produced a 
close imitation of Soviet examples (see Figure  4). The prescribed national 
forms were mechanically applied onto the otherwise identical neo-classical 
facades in an eclectic mixture imitating Bulgarian heritage from several past 
24 TsDA, f. 188, op. 1, a.e. 5, l. 6.
25 TsDA, f. 188, op. 1, a.e. 5, l. 147.
26 TsDA, f. 188, op. 1, a.e. 11, l. 102.
Stanoeva
southeastern europe 41 (2017) 112-140
<UN>
130
epochs which were not necessarily consistent with socialist aspirations, but 
represented historical achievements of Bulgarians: mainly, the medieval peri-
od of the independent Bulgarian kingdom prior to the Ottoman conquest and 
the Revival period under the late Ottoman Empire, when the cause of national 
liberation was pursued. Even though authored by separate architectural teams, 
the integrated buildings formed a monotonous and uniform framework for the 
ensemble, an effect that was reinforced by their matching exterior materials.
Ironically, the ensemble of the Largo, which the chief architect of the re-
public described as incarnating “Stalin-inspired care for the people” (Markov 
1953: 9), was completed in the years after Stalin’s death. Moreover, it was in-
augurated shortly after the succeeding Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, 
launched a process of de-Stalinization with his “secret speech” denouncing 
Stalin and especially his “cult of personality” at the 20th Congress of the cpsu 
in February 1956. In domestic policy, this turn led to increased attention to the 
material needs of the people—a positive approach of social mobilization that 
was meant to guarantee the regime’s popular legitimacy after the rejection of 
Stalin’s methods of political repression.
 De-Stalinization in Party Politics and Urbanism
From the mid-1950s onwards, de-Stalinization and the consequent shifts in par-
ty ideology under Khrushchev’s rule led to profound changes in the  urbanist 
Figure 4 The accepted plan for the House of Soviets (1954)
arhitektura 5–6/1954: 1–3.
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realm. The revision of previous conventions affected urban planning, which 
increasingly responded to more pragmatic considerations related to urban 
form and function, as well as public architecture, which opted for utilitarian 
designs in terms of style and types of buildings. Slower than the reworking of 
the art canon, institutional reform was also implemented, facilitating a relative 
emancipation in the professional status of architecture and urban planning.
Among other turbulent changes, de-Stalinization triggered a revision of the 
architectural canon. The decreed deadline for the completion of the Largo in 
Sofia coincided with a Soviet conference on construction convened in Mos-
cow in 1954 with the political objective of determining a new course in this 
realm. Its conclusions, conveyed in a governmental Resolution on the Removal 
of Exaggerations in Planning and Construction, sent a clear signal to Bulgar-
ian architects to abandon the “hitherto prevailing tendency towards an errone-
ous approach in the use of classical legacy and excessiveness,” as explained 
by Lyuben Tonev (1955: 3). The Stalinist style was discredited as contradicting 
the very spirit of socialism. This was articulated in an op-ed on the cult of per-
sonality in architecture in Bulgaria’s leading architectural journal Arhitektura 
which concluded that the “architectural forms of the slave-owning society and 
feudalism […] with their monumentality of stone and their coldness were in 
overt discrepancy with the vitality of the socialist system, with its deep hu-
manism” (Arhitektura 1962: 3).
The compositional principles of the Stalinist cliché were now stigma-
tized, which rendered previously acclaimed models such as Warsaw’s Palace 
of  Culture and Science examples of an erroneous path (Tonev 1960: 4). Con-
demned was not only their grandomania but also the over-expenditure of fi-
nancial and labor resources in their construction. In line with this verdict, a 
Commission for the Removal of Excesses and Luxuries in Construction was 
set up in  Bulgaria, duplicating a newly established Soviet agency, to review 
plans of  public and residential buildings. While the neo-classical design was 
exposed as an echo of “feudalism”, the prestige of socialist realism in Bulgaria 
remained   intact. Its  guidelines were instead redefined with an emphasis on 
functionality and expedience, as well as humanism— still an antipode of West-
ern art and its “aimless creativity unconstrained by any criterion” (Trufeshev 
1978: 44).
In the first years of de-Stalinization, architects were commissioned pre-
dominantly public buildings of social and cultural use rather than emblems 
of power, and an unprecedented number of hospitals, schools and local cul-
tural centers were built (Trufeshev 1968: 201). The value attached to minimiz-
ing construction costs urged architects and engineers to devise new methods 
under the umbrella terms of “standardization” and “typification”—that is, 
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 multiplying unified design types both in public construction and in the mush-
rooming housing estates. Although in the 1960s political monuments and head-
quarters returned to the agenda of Sofia’s socialist reconstruction— especially, 
the pending House of Soviets and cm seat—their projects never approached 
the imposing monumentality of the Party House or the ritualistic solemnity of 
Georgi Dimitrov’s Mausoleum. On the contrary, the new designs were aligned 
with the guidelines of functionalism and non-ornamentation, a shift particu-
larly visible when the plans for the House of Soviets before and after 1956 are 
compared (see Figure 4 and Figure 5).
As urban planning was also catching up with the spirit of post-Stalinism, 
comprehensive efforts for the socialist reconstruction of Sofia’s center were 
relaunched with a competition for a detailed plan in December 1963, this time 
with an international call. The competition brief reflected the new priority 
placed by domestic policy on the material needs of the population. Therefore, 
the future plan had to contain a commercial zone to improve consumer pro-
vision and “endue the image of the center with more modern features,” and 
monumental embellishment was diversified to include greenery, illuminations 
and street furniture, thus raising the everyday attractiveness of public space 
(biksgns 1964: 58). Public space was not stripped from political messages, but 
these were articulated in a more subtle way as the new central sites were meant 
to showcase the success of the command economy and the utopian promise 
Figure 5 Second-prize projects for the House of Soviets in the competition for a plan of the 
center in 1963
arhitektura 3/1964: 6, 20–21.
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of mass prosperity. Their rational socialist design, on the other hand, was in-
tended to mold socialist consumerism as a sensible, politically conscious and 
collectivist behavior.
The competition attracted entries mostly from abroad—both from Soviet 
bloc countries and Western Europe. This foreign participation was matched 
by an international jury composed of experts from the ussr, the gdr and Po-
land, joined also by a representative of the International Union of Architects 
( biksgns 1964: 59). The latter invitation was possible thanks to Khrushchev’s 
concept of peaceful coexistence with the West, which also impacted the paths 
of knowledge transfer. Although the architectural contest of 1963 did not pro-
duce a winning project, its guidelines would direct the endeavors of urban 
planning through the decade.
Towards the end of the 1960s, architects began to articulate an even more 
pragmatic vision for the development of Sofia. An opening for their critical 
reevaluation of the socialist city model was the increased autonomy of their 
professional niche. In 1965, the Union of Architects in Bulgaria (uab) was es-
tablished as a successor of the architectural section of the stu. Despite re-
taining the status of a state union, the secession from the larger technical 
union  strengthened the organization’s professional authority and sense of 
mission. Its self-awareness of public relevance was further fueled by the sym-
bolic recognition granted to architecture with the establishment in 1966 of 
the  Ministry of Architecture and Public Works, the first ministry in socialist 
Bulgaria to included architecture in its title.27 This double inauguration was 
interpreted as a “profound turning point in the public opinion’s perception of 
the activity of architects” and a first step in forging a power alliance, wherein 
the uab would serve as the right hand of the ministry.28 Moreover, in line with 
recent economic reforms of decentralizing the planning process that were ex-
perimented with across the bloc, the uab was granted rights of independent 
economic activity by negotiating its contracts with state, local and foreign 
investors.
Although in the coming years the sectoral administration would more often 
than not ignore the Union’s advice and thus deny it the authority it expected to 
hold,29 architects’ growing self-perception of expertise encouraged the uab to 
develop a critical stance on urbanist issues and seek civic outreach, thereby as-
serting itself as a public tribune of deliberation on proposed plans. What gave 
27 TsDA, f. 77A, op. 1, a.e. 3, l. 6.
28 Ibid., 51.
29 da-Sf, f. 2438, op. 1, a.e. 42, l. 79–81.
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architects the impetus to voice dissent was not only the relative corporative 
autonomy they had achieved, but also the pragmatist spirit of Brezhnev’s era, 
when utopian aspirations were toned down.
The uab’s most vocal criticism in the late 1960s concerned the continu-
ous destructive thrust against the pre-socialist architectural legacy, including 
the still intact palace, and the neglect of the deteriorating environmental 
conditions in Sofia. With regard to architectural preservation, many estab-
lished architects started emphasizing not only the cultural value of his-
torical buildings, but also the obsolescence of the iconoclastic approach to 
the past in light of the advanced stage of socialism that the country had 
entered.30 The revanchist obliteration of the “monarchic-bourgeois” heritage 
was now seen as an act of “cultural nihilism,” “architectural brutalism” and 
“formalistic lurch.”31 This heuristic discourse on the pre-socialist urban fab-
ric blended with emerging concerns about the city’s impact on the physical 
and mental health of residents. Urbanists’ awareness was raised about the 
burdensome effects of monotonous large-scale structures, the damage in-
flicted by traffic noise and air pollution, the recreational value of pedestrian 
movement and greenery, and the psychological need for a human scale in 
the cityscape.
The new urbanist debates stirred recognition that the socialist city might 
not be an antipode of the capitalist city, and this opened new avenues for 
the transfer of knowledge. The foreign examples referred to in expert discus-
sions ranged from Amsterdam, Brussels and Stockholm as the “most humane” 
European capitals, to Paris, London and Tokyo exemplifying an undesirable 
super-modernist trend.32 This reassessment was apparent throughout the So-
viet bloc—“a declining emphasis on normative and utopian concepts, more 
attention to actual forms of urbanization processes, the de facto acceptance of 
the universal nature of urbanization processes” (Musil 2003: 34). This  notion 
of convergence or at least comparability between socialist and capitalist  cities 
made Bulgarian architects reappraise even the bastions of “Western imperial-
ism”: “As regards New York, which we consider to be an erroneously  constructed 
city, they make reconstructions and they do them more carefully than us. They 
are beginning to think much more about the individual than we, who claim 
that caring for people is paramount for us.”33
30 da-Sf, f. 2438, op. 1, a.e. 42, l. 59.
31 Ibid., 51, 54, 83.
32 Ibid., 54, 89–90, 95–96, 134.
33 Ibid., 136.
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 Post-Socialist Sofia: Radical Change or Path Dependence?
After the collapse of state socialism in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, the 
countries in the region went through a profound political, social, economic, 
and, not least of these, mental transformation. This transformation was par-
ticularly visible in cities and especially national capitals, as it affected prop-
erty rights, administrative procedures, rules of public conduct and patterns of 
economic development, simultaneously opening up their space for free po-
litical expression and private business activities. Whereas the images of civic 
demonstrations exuded public enthusiasm for change, economic reshuffling 
produced a far more controversial narrative of “transition,” and its outcomes 
were rarely celebrated with the same enthusiasm. What some have dubbed a 
localized manifestation of “wild capitalism” (Birne at al. 2006), while others 
have attributed it to global processes of unchecked neoliberal advance, pro-
duced a radical breach in the development path of formerly socialist cities. Yet, 
despite being framed by essentially different economic models, some urban 
repercussions of trends before and after 1989 do not stand so far apart, indicat-
ing a certain path dependence.
Among the things that the socialist and the post-socialist incarna-
tions of Sofia have in common, an interesting point of comparison are the 
 approaches of authorities to the monumental layer of public space. Creating 
 highly- mediatized footage of the “end of communism,” the ruby red star on 
top of the Party House was removed by helicopter in the autumn of 1990, and 
nine years later the Mausoleum of Georgi Dimitrov, by then a hollow structure 
(his remains being cremated in July 1990), was destroyed after week-long deto-
nations (Todorova 2006). Beyond the façade of such symbolic ruptures with 
the past, their enactment was all but radically different from the socialist style 
of top-down resolutions on urban issues, disregarding public opinion, profes-
sional input or even local decision-making.
In the early 1990s, the then mayor of Sofia, Aleksander Yanchulev, tried to 
reinstate municipal property rights over the Mausoleum’s plot, which had 
been illegally seized by the central government almost half a century earlier. 
His multiple letters appealing to the new democratic government fell on deaf 
ears, so the municipal plan to restore the integrity of the City Garden and to 
subsidize the construction of social housing by auctioning the Mausoleum’s 
movables was shelved.34 In the same period, the uab, now a completely in-
dependent professional organization, publicized alternative proposals for cre-
ative appropriation of the Mausoleum that would transform the building into 
34 da-Sofia, f. 65, op. 15, a.e. 34, l. 1–20.
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a museum dedicated to the atrocities of the communist regime. As authorities 
did not back the idea, the former Mausoleum was simply destroyed five years 
later and until today the void it left is visible in the empty rectangle of partially 
broken pavement along the frontal axis of Sofia’s City Garden.
Whereas the Mausoleum was blown up in a superficial gesture of breaking 
away from the past, the former Party House, once the cosmetic removal of its 
communist crown-piece was completed, became a seat of the Parliament of 
democratic Bulgaria. While these two acts of dealing with the material legacy 
of socialism seem diametrically opposite, in both of them one can detect strik-
ing continuity with the past. If in the Mausoleum’s case continuity shines 
through non-transparent and overtly centralized decision-making, in the lat-
ter case it is evident in the literal preservation of the ivory tower of power. The 
imposing structure of the building and its solemn marble interior, once an 
expression of Stalin’s vision of rule, should now accommodate a very different 
notion of the relationship between “rulers” and “ruled”—one in which citizens 
have not only true electoral power but also a say in decisions concerning the 
common good, and the members of government are civil servants, electable 
and accountable. To what extent these parliamentary headquarters can con-
vey such a notion or instill it in those who occupy the offices is a challenging 
question. After all, places are not neutral containers of social life but actively 
shape and even breed public practices—something that, as shown above, the 
socialist vision of urban transformation heavily relied on, taking a cue from 
Marx’s dialectical materialism. Their structure and design foster particular be-
havioral patterns not only of using space but also of interacting with others 
within it, thus conditioning intergroup positioning, social relations and exer-
cise of power.
To the above examples of continuity in the urban development of Sofia be-
fore and after 1989, one can add authorities’ vision of collective memory that 
still adheres to the grand narrative of national history and to the static style 
of pedestaled monuments, as well as their neglect for the environmental de-
terioration of the city. The latter, recognized by urbanists in the late 1960s but 
never consistently dealt with in the decades of socialism and post-socialism, 
had meanwhile reached an alarming high as Sofia won the trophy for the most 
polluted capital in Europe.
The concept of path dependence concerns not only the structural precondi-
tioning of problems and solutions by their pursuit in the past, but also the per-
severance of social institutions, cultural practices and patterns of organizing 
life across different historical contexts. In light of all the detected symptoms 
of path dependence in Sofia’s contemporary development, the study of its so-
cialist past is not just a historical exercise but can also provide a compass for 
 137Ideology And Urbanism In A Flux
southeastern europe 41 (2017) 112-140
<UN>
meaningful urban change today that could offset the negative imprints of both 
the socialist era and the decades of convulsive transition.
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